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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM*
I. INTRODUCTION
U NTIL recently, the field of corporation law was viewed by many as
a relatively settled, albeit complex, body of rules designed to provide
a framework for the conduct of business activity. As such it was primarily
of interest to the corporate bar whose business it was to advise corporate
leaders how to attain their desired goals without breaking any of the
rules of the system. The framework itself was of ancient vintage and
largely devoid of any significant policy content.
Such a characterization is no longer appropriate. A series of policy-
oriented laws and judicial decisions have wrought fundamental changes
in the relative rights and duties of officers, directors and shareholders,
and in the relationship of the corporation to the external world. In 1964,
Congress extended the federal securities registration requirements in the
Securities Exchange Act of 19341 to over-the-counter securities, impos-
ing regulation analogous in substance to federal incorporation.2 The
continuing development of case law under rule 10b-5 3 promulgated pur-
suant to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Acte has added to the
fiduciary duties of corporate officers and directors.5 State court decisions
have also redefined the fiduciary duties of corporate insiders' and the
responsibility of majority shareholders to the minority.7 Expanded powers
have been granted to shareholders of corporations as a result of several
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received his BA. summa cum laude from St. Joseph's College in Indiana and his J.D. with
distinction from the University of Michigan. He was a Fullbright scholar in Belgium
in 1961-62 and a Ford Foundation scholar in Germany in 1965-66.
Support for the research reported in this article was received from the University of
North Carolina and is gratefully acknowledged. The author wishes to thank Professor
Dr. Klemens Pleyer and Dr. Joachim Lieser of the Institut fur Bankrecht of the University
of Cologne, Germany for their advice and for permission to use the research facilities of
the Institut.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78hh-1 (1970).
2. Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. Law. 27,
29-30 (1969).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-S (1971).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
5. The leading case is, of course, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 US. 976 (1969). Subsequent developments and cases are
summarized in A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud-S.E.C. Rule 10b-S (1969).
6. See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78
(1969).
7. See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co, 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592 (1969).
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decisions based upon the proxy rules of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission.8
These and other developments in the law, as well as the continuing
crisis in American society-an unpopular war, unemployment, racial
conflict and environmental degradation-have produced a movement to
examine the fundamental principles underlying the body of corporate law
with a view to their policy basis. The new focus centers on how corpo-
rations are actually constituted, the real process of corporate decision-
making and the role of the corporation in society. Thus, Professor Eisen-
berg, in a brilliant series of articles,' has carried out a fundamental re-
assessment of what he calls the "received legal model" for corporate
decisionmaking. Several other authorities have made searching inquiries
into the problem of corporate responsibility and the relationship of the
corporation to the external world.1"
This article will attempt to carry forward the movement inquiring into
the fundamental principles of corporate law. It will focus on the pervasive
concept of corporate disclosure in the federal securities laws and examine
the relationship between disclosure, corporate responsibility and the
"received legal model" for corporate decisionmaking. The article will
summarize the present state of corporate disclosure requirements under
the federal securities laws, consider the theoretical bases of disclosure,
and offer suggestions for the implementation of greater disclosure re-
quirements for corporations.
II. CoRPoRATE DIsCLosuRE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE
FEDERAL SECURITIEs LAWS1 1
A. Disclosure Under the Securities Act of 193312
A corporation first comes under federal disclosure requirements when it
8. The leading cases are: Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); J.1.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 US. 426 (1964); Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432
F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded for dismissal as moot, 92 S. Ct. 577 (1972).
9. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate
Decisionmaking, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1969); Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy
Machinery, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1489 (1970); Eisenberg, Megasubsidiarics: The Effect of
Corporate Structure on Corporate Control, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1577 (1971).
10. There is more research and writing on this subject at the present than at any time
since the 1930s. E.g., Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50 Boston
U.L. Rev. 157 (1970); Blumberg, The Politicalization of the Corporation, 26 Bus. Law.
1551 (1971) ; Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate
Responsibility, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 248 (1969); Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Con-
test: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 421 (1971).
11. Since these requirements are generally well known, they will be dealt with in
summary form with the emphasis placed on certain developing and problem areas.
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (1970).
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issues securities.13 Unless exempted,14 no sale of a security may be made
unless a registration statement is in effect with respect to the security.Y
Since securities generally cannot be registered "for the shelf,"'" a new
registration statement must be prepared and filed by the corporation each
time securities are issued. Although the security, not the company, is
required to be registered, most of the information required in a registra-
tion statement concerns the company. This includes information about
the management and controlling shareholders of the issuer, the character
of its business, its earnings history and capital structure, pending or
threatened legal proceedings, the planned use of the proceeds of the of-
fering, and financial statements certified by independent accountants 7
The registration requirement is enforced through the supervisory power
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, which gives careful attention
to each statement filed'8 and has the power to delay or suspend the ef-
fectiveness of a registration statement."' A material misstatement or
omission of material fact in the statement can result in civil and criminal
proceedings20 as well as civil liability to innocent purchasers.2 ' In order to
assure the dissemination of the information to the public and to potential
investors, the Securities Act requires the delivery of a prospectus con-
taining information essentially identical to that in the registration state-
ment.22
B. Disclosure Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Securities Exchange Act imposes disclosure requirements on
corporations in addition to those imposed by the Securities Act. Unlike
the Securities Act, the Securities Exchange Act requires registration of
securities of companies of a certain size. Any company having total as-
13. Securities Act § 5, is U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
14. Sections 3 and 4 of the Securities Act provide limited exemptions. Id. §§ 3 & 4, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77c & 77d (1970).
15. Id. § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
16. Section 6(a) of the Act states that a registration statement "shall be deemed effec-
tive only as to the securities specified therein as proposed to be offered." Id. § 6(a), 15
U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1970).
17. See Form S-1 Registration Statement under the Securities Act of 1933, in Securities
Regulation Sourcebook 3-1 (Knauss ed. 1970-71).
18. See 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 265-316 (2d ed. 1961).
19. Securities Act §§ 8(b) & (d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h(b) & (d) (1970).
20. Id. § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970).
21. Id. §§ 11 & 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k & 771 (1970).
22. Id. § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970). The prospectus delivery requirement has never
functioned as envisioned in the Securities Act. The Securities and Exchange Commission
has recently acted to improve the dissemination and delivery of Securities Act prospectuses.
See Disclosure to Investors-A Reappraisal of Administrative Policies under the '33 and
'34 Acts 106-26 (1969) (popularly known as the Wheat Report) [hereinafter cited as The
Wheat Report]; Posner, Developments in Federal Securities Regulation, 26 Bus. Law. 1677,
1689-91 (1971).
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sets exceeding one million dollars and a class of equity securities held of
record by 500 or more persons must register its securities under section
12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act.23 Securities listed on a national
securities exchange are exempt from this requirement, but the issuers
thereof are required to register the securities with the exchange, with
duplicate originals of the registration statement going to the Securities
and Exchange Commission.24 The information required of both classes
of issuers is similar and approaches that required in a Securities Act
registration statement.25
The information disclosed through initial registration with the Com-
mission is required to be kept up to date. Section 13 of the Securities
Exchange Act20 provides that all companies subject to registration under
section 12 of that Act, as well as certain other companies having registered
securities under the Securities Act, must file periodic reports. Included
are an annual report (Form 10-K) which is due 90 days after the close
of each fiscal year,27 a quarterly report (Form 10-Q) which must be filed
within 45 days of the end of each of the first three quarters of each
fiscal year,28 and a current report (Form 8-K) which must be filed within
10 days of the close of any month in which any one of several specified
events occurs.29
The Securities Exchange Act also requires all companies whose securi-
ties are subject to section 12 to distribute proxy materials to sharehold-
ers.30 These materials must disclose information regarding the business,
management and financial history of the issuer substantially similar to
that contained in the original registration and periodic reports under the
Securities Exchange Act. Unlike the disclosures made in the latter docu-
ments, the information contained in the proxy materials reaches the
shareholders since the materials are actually sent to them. If a proxy
solicitation is made on behalf of management regarding an annual meet-
ing at which directors are to be elected, the proxy materials must be ac-
companied or preceded by an annual report which can be in any form
23. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970).
24. Securities Exchange Act § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1970).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 249.210 (1971).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970).
27. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9000 (Oct. 21, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 77,919, at 80,048.
28. Id. No. 9004 (Oct. 28, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
ff 77,920, at 80,050.
29. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1971).
30. Securities Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970). Even if the company
does not solicit proxies, substantially equivalent information must be sent to shareholders.,
Id. § 14(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1970).
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deemed suitable by management, but which must contain, with minor
exceptions, certified financial statements.3 1
Significant penalties are provided for failure to comply with any of
the Securities Exchange Act registration and reporting requirements,
including civil proceedings by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
criminal prosecution by the Department of Justice and civil actions by
private persons32
C. Developing Areas of Disclosure
1. Coordination of Securities Act and Securities Exchange
Act Requirements
In a well known article in 1966, 3 Mr. Milton Cohen proposed a better
coordinated system of disclosure by increasing the quality and quantity
of disclosure required under the Securities Exchange Act and eliminating
unnecessary duplication of disclosure under the Securities Act. This be-
came one of the central themes of the "Wheat Report,"' a study com-
missioned by the Securities and Exchange Commission to examine the
operation of disclosure under the securities laws. The Wheat Report made
specific recommendations for changing the emphasis of disclosure from
initial registration to continuous disclosure.
The Commission has either proposed or adopted many of the reforms
urged by the Wheat Report. The registration and reporting requirements
under sections 12 and 13 of the Securities Exchange Act were revised to
provide information similar to that required in a Securities Act registra-
tion statement35 Form 10, the general registration form under the Se-
curities Exchange Act, must disclose a summary of operations for the
past five years, the dollar amount of backlog of orders and a greater
amount of information relating to management 38 Form 10-K, the princi-
pal form used for filing annual reports, must contain a breakdown of sales
and contributions to profits attributable to each line of business of the
company, as well as more information about properties, management,
business history and transactions with insiders3 7
The Commission has also changed the interim reporting requirements
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1971).
32. Securities Exchange Act §§ 10, 18 & 21(e), 15 U.S.C §§ 78j, 78r & 78u(e) (1970).
33. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1340 (1966).
34. See note 22 supra.
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781 & 78m (1970).
36. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8996 (Oct. 14, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 77,914, at 80,034.
37. Id. No. 9000 (Oct. 21, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
77,919, at 80,048-49.
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under the Securities Exchange Act. Form 9-K, used for the filing of semi-
annual reports, was rescinded and a new Form 10-Q has been adopted for
use in filing the required quarterly reports.88 Uncertified financial infor-
mation must be disclosed in this form as well as information regarding
the capitalization of the company. 9 The Commission is also studying
Form 8-K, which is used in the prompt reporting of certain specified
events, and will probably revise it or incorporate it into an expanded
Form 10-Q.40
Substantial progress was made toward making Securities Act registra-
tion requirements less burdensome in cases in which information normally
required in a registration statement was already available through the
Securities Exchange Act system of disclosure. Amendments to Form S-7,
a short form adopted in 1967 for registration of securities of well estab-
lished companies under the Securities Act, make it available to a larger
class of issuers.4 The period during which the registrant must have been
subject to and complied with the Securities Exchange Act reporting and
proxy requirements has been shortened from five years to three years.43
The requirement that the registrant must have engaged in business of
substantially the same general character since the beginning of its last
five fiscal years was eliminated.4 3 The minimum gross sales or gross
revenues requirement was deleted and the minimum net income test was
lowered.44 A new Form S-16 was also adopted for securities of any issuer
meeting the Form S-7 requirements; it may be used for offerings by
selling security holders on a national securities exchange, offerings by
an issuer to holders of convertible securities of an affiliate which are
convertible into securities of the issuer, and offerings regarding publicly
held warrants."
These changes were accompanied by Securities and Exchange Com-
mission steps to increase the dissemination of information available under
the Securities Exchange Act. In 1968 a microfiche system was instituted
under which a subscriber to the service is able to receive copies of filed
documents reproduced on a relatively inexpensive sheet of film contain-
ing photographic images of up to 60 pages of material. 40 As a result, sub-
38. Id. No. 9004 (Oct. 28, 1970), (1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed, Sec. L. Rep.
ff 77,920, at 80,050.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5100 (Nov. 12, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 77,927, at 80,059.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. No. 5117 (Dec. 23, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
ff 77,941, at 80,094-95.
46. See The Wheat Report 313-18.
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scribers are able to obtain copies of Securities Exchange Act reports
shortly after they are filed with the Commission.
There is every indication that these changes are only the beginning of
what will be one of the major efforts of the Commission in the years
ahead. The ultimate goal is to drastically increase the amount of infor-
mation a company must disclose on a continuing basis, the dissemination
of this information, and the number of companies required to make such
disclosure. These ends will probably not be fully realized, however, un-
til the completion of the project to recodify the federal securities laws. '
2. Securities and Exchange Commission Encouragement of
Disclosure Going Beyond Statutory Requirements
The Securities Exchange Act provisions for continuous reporting are
applicable only to companies having securities listed on a national ex-
change, s companies with total assets exceeding one million dollars and
having a class of equity securities held of record by 500 or more persons, 9
and certain additional companies which have filed a registration statement
under the Securities Act. 0 In recent months, however, the Securities and
Exchange Commission has exercised its rulemaking power to encourage
companies which do not fall into one of the above categories to "volun-
tarily" subject themselves to the Securities Exchange Act requirements.
This has been primarily accomplished through two recent Commission
releases.51
In adopting rule 15c2-1l 52 under section 15(c) of the Securities Ex-
change Act,53 the Commission intended to curb the abuses of certain
companies "going public" without registration by utilizing a shell corpo-
ration or certain spin-off devices. The scope of the rule is quite broad,
however, prohibiting a broker-dealer from submitting any quotation for
any security to any quotation medium without assuring that meaningful
financial information is publicly available either through the registration
and reporting requirements of the Securities Act and the Securities Ex-
change Act, or by the broker-dealer himself providing specified informa-
47. See Loss, The Current Status of SEC Codification, 26 Bus. Law. 555 (1970).
48. Securities Exchange Act § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1970).
49. Id. § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970).
50. Id. § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1970).
51. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
1 78,487, at 81,049; SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9310 (Sept. 13, 1971), CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. No. 387, at 49 (extra ed., Sept. 15, 1971). See notes 52-S6 infra and
accompanying text.
52. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9310 (Sept. 13, 1971), CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. No. 387, at 49 (extra ed., Sept. 15, 1971).
53. 15 U.S.C. 78o(c)(2) (1970).
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tdon -similar to that available in Securities Exchange Act reports. 4 The
obvious practical effect of this rule is to provide a great incentive for all
companies whose stock is publicly traded to subject themselves to the
Securities Exchange Act reporting requirements even though they are not
required to do so by statute.
Rule 14 4 ,11 the newly adopted letter stock rule of the Commission, at-
tempts to provide more objective and policy oriented tests for permis-
sible sales by control persons and resales by private purchasers. The
rule distinguishes between securities of companies for which public in-
formation is available under the Securities Exchange Act requirements or
new rule 15c2-11, and securities of all other companies. The use of rule
144 in large measure is limited to holders of securities of companies in
the former category.5" This creates additional pressure on companies to
voluntarily subject themselves to continuous public disclosure require-
ments.
3. Disclosure Relating to the Environment and Civil Rights
The Commission has responded to contemporary concern about in-
dustrial pollution and discrimination against minority groups in employ-
ment in a recently issued release. 7 Issuers subject to the Securities Act
or the Securities Exchange Act must disclose, if material, when compliance
with new environmental laws may necessitate significant outlays of capi-
tal affecting the earning power or nature of the business. Companies must
also disclose material legal proceedings arising out of various anti-pol-
lution laws. In the area of civil rights, disclosure is required as to material
legal proceedings which may result in the cancellation of a government
contract or a change in the nature of the business done. 8
Although the Commission announced this release as its response to
changing national priorities, it is evident that little more is required under
the new release than was already necessary under prior laws and regula-
tions. Perhaps the only thing new is the requirement that any informa-
tion relating to these two areas which is omitted from a filing must be
disclosed to the Commission with the reasons for its omission.'"
54. The new rule specifies 16 categories of disclosure which the broker-dealer must
furnish concerning the company.
55. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 78,487,
at 81,049.
56. Id.
57. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5170, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9252
(July 19, 1971), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 78,150, at 80,487.
58. Id. at 80,488.
59. Id. The Commission may thus use its supervisory power to compel disclosure.
(Vol. 40
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4. The Obligation of Affirmative Timely Disclosure
In addition to disclosure obligations arising under the provisions of
the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act, disclosure require-
ments are maintained by the major stock exchanges for issuers of listed
securities 60 and by the National Association of Securities Dealers for
issuers of over-the-counter traded stock."' These rules and policies ex-
press a general policy that companies are to make timely disclosure of
material business developments."' It is generally assumed that there is
no legal obligation of corporate disclosure under these rules,e but en-
forcement by a stock exchange of its timely disclosure policies will be
upheld."
Another source of a timely disclosure requirement may be rule 10b- 51-
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act."0 Although it is
well established that a corporation may be liable under rule 10b-5 for a
disclosure that is materially misleading or omits to state a material fact,
it is unsettled whether rule 10b-5 creates an affirmative obligation to make
public disclosure of corporate developments going beyond the continuous
reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act. 7 Two recent
Securities and Exchange Commission releases seem to recognize a limited
duty of affirmative disclosure under rule 10b-5.
In an October 1970 release, 8 the Commission spoke approvingly of the
timely disclosure requirements of the major exchanges and implied that
rule 10b-5 imposed a similar obligation. Despite some ambiguous language
that would lead to a more conservative interpretation," the Commission
clearly stated that there is an affirmative obligation to make prompt dis-
60. American Stock Exchange Company Guide § 401, at 101 (1968); N.Y. Stock Ex-
change Company Manual § A 2, at A-18 (1968).
61. National Association of Securities Dealers Manual g 2155, at 2073 (1971).
62. The New York Stock Exchange requires companies to "release quickly to the public
any news or information which might reasonably be expected to materially affect the
market for securities." N.Y. Stock Exchange Company Manual § A 2, at A-18 (1968).
63. Alberg, SEC Disclosure Requirements for Corporations, 26 Bus. Law. 1223, 1224
(1971).
64. In re Intercontinental Indus., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8858
(April 3, 1970), [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 77,827, at 83,911.
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
67. Because nearly all public corporations now maintain a continuous flow of informa-
tion, the distinction may be unimportant. See Alberg, supra note 63, at 1225.
68. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5092, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8995, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 6209 (Oct. 15, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f1 77,915, at 80,035.
69. See Posner, supra note 22, at 1710.
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closure of material facts regarding the company's financial condition. 0
It will be up to the courts to reconcile the view expressed by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission release with the existing view that affirma-
tive disclosure is not required where there is a valuable corporate purpose
not to disclose.71
In a subsequent release dated August 1971,72 the Commission issued
guidelines for the disclosure of information by issuers whose securities are
in the process of registration under the Securities Act. The release strongly
reaffirms the Commission's mandate in prior releases and rules73 that
corporate information channels are to be kept open during the registration
process. According to the release, factual information relating to business
and financial developments must be continuously disclosed by the issuer
both voluntarily and in response to unsolicited inquiries from stock-
holders and the press.74 Only predictions, projections, estimates and opin-
ions concerning value are not to be disclosed.7
Unfortunately, the August release leaves open two serious questions of
disclosure which may arise in the period during which an issuer's securi-
ties are in the process of being registered under the Securities Act. First,
little guidance is provided with regard to when the release of corporate
information during this period will be considered an "offer" in violation
of section 5 (c) of the Securities Act.70 The release states that this will
continue to be determined on a case-by-case basis considering the facts
and circumstances surrounding each case; 77 presumably, however, an
issuer which makes certain that its disclosures are within the guidelines
set out by the release will be afforded some protection.
A second and related question, also left open by the August release, is
70. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5092, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8995, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 6209 (Oct. 15, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 77,915, at 80,035.
71. Affirmative disclosure is required, however, if the corporation or insiders are pur-
chasing or selling the corporation's securities or if nondisclosure would cause a prior
release of information to be misleading. See Alberg, supra note 63, at 1224.
72. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5180 (Aug. 16, 1971), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. II 78,192, at 80,578.
73. See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 5101, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
9010 (Nov. 19, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep, fT 77,929, at
80,061, which clarifies the permissible scope of circulation of information by issuers and
broker-dealers prior to and immediately subsequent to the filing of a Securities Act registration
statement.
74. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5180 (Aug. 16, 1971), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. IT 78,192, at 80,579.
75. Id.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1970).
77. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5180 (Aug. 16, 1971), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 78,192, at 80,580.
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the extent to which the newly developing obligations to make timely dis-
closure will conflict with the statutory obligation to refrain from publish-
ing information amounting to a prohibited offer during the registration
period. The Commission considers this possible difficulty "more apparent
than real,"78 but as Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp."
shows, it may be a difficult problem, and it will probably be necessary for
the Commission to face this question directly at some future time.
IMI. THE THEORETICAL BASES OF CORPORATE
DisCLosuRE REQUIREMENTS
Considering the pervasiveness of the concept of disclosure in the federal
securities laws, it is surprising that there has been relatively little exami-
nation of the purpose of the doctrine either in the legislative history of
the acts or in the writings of the commentators. The principal contro-
versy at the time the Securities Act was passed was whether to adopt
the disclosure approach to securities regulation or to grant governmental
authorities the power to pass on the merits of an issue of securities'
Disclosure, of course, ultimately prevailed, chiefly because it was the
theory of the English Companies Act8' and because governmental regula-
tion was thereby minimized. 82 One can, however, identify three fundamen-
tal reasons for disclosure requirements: investor protection, the creation
of a free and open securities market, and the raising of standards of
conduct of corporate fiduciaries.
A. Investor Protection
To those responsible for the drafting and passage of the securities
acts, the principal objective of disclosure was to protect the investor. The
effort was to assure the potential purchaser of a security that he could
obtain adequate information regarding the security and furthermore that
78. Id. at 80,579.
79. 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970). In this case Chris-Craft sought to enjoin an exchange
offer because of a press release which allegedly violated section 5(c) of the Securities Act.
The defendant's response was that the press release, which contained the value of the
exchange offer, was required by rule 10b-5 and section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.
The court resolved the question by stating that disclosure was not required under lob-5 be-
cause the value of the exchange was not material. Thus, a violation of section 5(c) and
Rule 135 was found. Id. at 574. The dissent vigorously criticized the majority's finding that
the value of the exchange offer was not material to a reasonable investor. Id. at 580.
80. Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus. Law.
300, 301 & n.6 (1961); Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933,
28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 29, 30-34 (1959).
81. 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38 (1948).
82. Heller, supra note 80, at 301; see A. Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming
of the New Deal 441-42 (1958).
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the information would not be fraudulent or misleading.8 3 A need was
recognized for the law to intervene in the free market on the side of the
customer, the "consumer" of securities because, unlike most consumer
goods, the value of a security can not be adequately determined by
physical inspection or use. The customer therefore had to be provided
with a detailed description of the product."
The basis for the necessity of governmental intervention to aid the
purchaser of securities had been provided by many scholars of the
period. Attention had been called to the degree of concentration of busi-
ness activity in corporate "giants" managed by a small group of pro-
fessionals.85 This phenomenon, coupled with a trend toward greater
dispersion of stock ownership among ever increasing numbers of people,
led to the realization that there was a separation of ownership from con-
trol in the modern business corporation. 6 Small management groups were
responsible for the handling of "other people's money. 8 7 There was a
widespread feeling in 1933 that the system as a whole had failed and that
the investor had to be protected. 8
It is interesting to note then, that the primary objective of the reformers
was not corporate disclosure but securities disclosure. The required infor-
mation regarding the management and business of the issuer was only
incidentally required as a necessary adjunct to disclosure regarding the
security. The fact that at the point of departure in the American law of
securities regulation the primacy of the idea of full corporate disclosure
was overlooked has contributed to the problems concerning disclosure in
the ensuing years.
B. The Creation of a Free and Open Securities Market
Another basis for requiring disclosure relating to securities is to ensure
that the securities markets will operate in a free and open fashion. This
purpose is closely related to protection of the investor in that it makes
possible an intelligent choice on his part. The availability of information
83. See Message of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Congress on March 29, 1933,
in H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933); Heller, "Integration" of the Dis.
semination of Information Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 29 Law and Contemp. Prob. 749, 768 (1964); James, The Securities Act
of 1933, 32 Mich. L. Rev. 624, 632 (1934).
84. Hetherington, supra note 10, at 263.
85. See 1 L. Loss, supra note 18, at 8-10.
86. A. Berle & G. Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property (1932).
A revised edition of this work was published in 1968.
87. L. Brandeis, Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It (1914).
88. See A. Schlesinger, supra note 82, at 434 for a discussion of the 1933 investigation Into
banking, stock exchange, and security practices by Ferdinand Pecora, Counsel to the Senate
Banking and Currency Committee.
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also helps assure that the price of a security will more nearly correspond
with its actual value. 9
The concept of assuring a free and open securities market also has the
aim of improving the allocative efficiency of the capital markets. The
economic function of a capital market is to channel capital from economic
units with a surplus of funds to economic units which can use such funds
most productively.90 Thus, a goal of disclosure policy is to avoid possible
interruptions of securities markets by assuring that all investors have
equal access to information.9 With full information, investors will tend
to make wiser investment decisions, thereby allocating capital resources
more efficiently. Furthermore, it is posited that the operational efficiency
of the securities markets will be improved as well, allowing the securities
industry to produce a given service at the lowest possible cost. 2
Whether full disclosure does in fact improve the efficiency of the
securities markets is a question that will not be resolved without additional
empirical research. The research performed to date appears to be incon-
clusive. While data developed by some economists indicates that public
disclosure of information about corporations does not have a significant
effect upon the market prices of securities, 3 and the cost of regulating
insider trading exceeds the benefits of regulation, 4 other economists
have put forth findings which suggest that the economic performance of
the securities markets has improved since the advent of regulation 3
Operational and allocational efficiency is bound to increase in impor-
tance as a purpose of disclosure and of securities regulation. Research is
needed regarding the optimum pattern of disclosure for the attainment of
maximum efficiency. How this goal is to be balanced with regard to other
possibly conflicting aims of regulation must be determined.
C. Assuring Higher Standards of Fiduciary
Conduct by Corporate Managers
At the time of the passage of the securities acts, the more perceptive
writers noted that these acts would have an effect on the conduct of
89. See James, supra note 83, at 632; Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure,
62 Afich. L. Rev. 607, 614 (1964); The Wheat Report 50.
90. Friend, The SEC and the Economic Performance of Securities Markets, in Economic
Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities 185, 187 (H. Aanne ed. 1969).
91. West, Timely Disclosure-The View from 11 Wall Street, 24 Sw. L.J. 241, 246 (1970).
92. Friend, supra note 90, at 192-94.
93. Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Require-
ments, in Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities 23 (H. Manne
ed. 1969).
94. Demsetz, Perfect Competition, Regulation, and the Stock Market, in Economic
Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities 1, 11-17 (H. Manne ed. 1969).
95. E.g., Friend, supra note 90.
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corporate insiders." Since more of their actions would be subject to public
view through disclosure, there would be a tendency for corporate managers
to avoid conflicts of interest and questionable business practices. 7 This
has now been generally accepted by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission as a major goal of disclosure."' By opening matters to public
scrutiny, societal standards as to what is permissible conduct will actually
be raised, thereby constituting a check on the manner in which a corporate
manager may handle other people's money.
D. Disclosure and Corporate Responsibility
In recent years a new policy basis for corporate disclosure has emerged.
Its scope is not yet clear and it has not yet received formal recognition
in the law, but its significance cannot be underestimated. This is the
idea, first expressed by Professors Cary 0 and Knauss, 00 that disclosure
has a role in regulating corporations as major power centers of our society.
Acceptance of this wider role of disclosure to any degree is to say that
there is a direct relationship between corporate disclosure under the
securities laws and corporate responsibility.101
The novelty of this view should be emphasized. It would mean that
disclosure is not merely investor-oriented but society-oriented. The ef-
ficient allocation of capital resources is secondary to the ethical and moral
aspects of disclosure-and ethics and morality encompass more than
merely restraining overreaching by insiders. The heart of the problem
is getting at the impact of corporate behavior on society, not only as to
its financial affairs, but also in the areas of civil liberties, the environment,
health, safety and consumer rights.
Two well entrenched concepts of present securities law prevent the
further development of disclosure as an instrument of corporate respon-
sibility. First, the securities acts require registration of securities, not
companies; second, disclosure is conceived of as relating merely to in-
vestors and the investment community. The validity of these propositions
is questionable.
1. Registration of Companies, Not Securities
In 1969, Professor Loss stated that it was time to think in terms of
registering companies, not securities, under the federal securities laws. 02
96. E.g., Frankfurter, Securities Act-Social Consequences, Fortune, Aug. 1933, at 55
97. Id.
98. The Wheat Report 50-52; see Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 Calif.
L. Rev. 408, 410-11 (1962).
99. Cary, supra note 98, at 419.
100. Knauss, supra note 89, at 646-48.
101. See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 526.
102. 46 ALI Proceedings 259 (1969).
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This was regarded as desirable in order to eliminate unnecessary duplica-
tion of disclosure under the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange
Act and to emphasize and ensure the better dissemination of continuous
corporate reporting. As indicated earlier,z0 3 this was also a major theme of
the Wheat Report. °4 The Securities and Exchange Commission has be-
gun to implement a disclosure system based more on company registra-
tion through the promulgation of new Securities Act forms and Securities
Exchange Act requirements, 105 and through the installation in 1968 of
a microfiche system which allows its subscribers to receive documents
containing required information about the corporation shortly after they
are filed.'0 6
There are, perhaps, more basic reasons for changing from securities
disclosure to company disclosure. For this inquiry, the experience of other
legal systems and in particular the German legal pattern of company
disclosure is instructive.' In Germany there are disclosure requirements
upon incorporation and the issuance of shares as well as continuing dis-
closure obligations.
a. The German Pattern: Disclosure upon
Incorporation and Issuance of Shares
In German law, incorporation of a stock company is not a mere for-
mality; it is an important transaction which includes an obligation of
substantial public disclosure. The corporation can exist as a legal person
only upon the entry of required information into the trade register
(Handeisregister) .10 Much of the information is published in the Bundes-
anzeiger, an official government publication, and the documents required
in the application for entry into the trade register are available for in-
spection by members of the public and the court (the Amtsgericht, the
lowest German court of original jurisdiction) to which application has
been made' 9
103. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
104. The Wheat Report 55-64.
105. See text accompanying notes 35-45 supra.
106. See The Wheat Report 313-18; text accompanying note 46 supra.
107. Since at least 1959, the year of the "little revision" of German stock company
law, there has been an important movement underway in Germany to require business
entites to make increased information about their affairs available to the public. Similar
currents have been at work in other European countries and on the supranational level in
the European Communities, but the German movement is perhaps the most developed and
therefore the most interesting. A. Hueck, Gesellschaftsrecht 111-15 (15th ed. 1970).
108. Aktiengesetz § 41(1) (C.H. Beck 1965) [hereinafter cited as AktG]. The Aktiengesetz
has been published in a bilingual edition. See Aktiengesetz 1965: The German Stock
Corporation Law (R. Mueller & E. Galbraith transl. 1966).
109. The application for registration must include copies of the articles of association
(Satzung), documents relating to the appointment of the board of management and the
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The incorporation procedure and its attendant disclosure obligation
is the same whether or not the stock is to be distributed to the public.
All shares must initially be subscribed by the founders.110 Public dis-
tribution is carried out through syndicates of banks which underwrite
and sell the issue. Before agreeing to act as underwriter, the banks in-
vestigate all aspects of the company and their judgment acts as protection
for investors." 1
Because of the lack of an American-type over-the-counter market
in Germany, new issues of securities are commonly listed on one of the
supervisory board, the formation report (Griindungsbericht), the examination reports of
the board of management, the supervisory board as well as the formation auditors, and a
certificate that the report of the formation auditors has been submitted to the Chamber
of Industry and Commerce. AktG § 37(2).
The availability of these documents assures that much information about the company
will be available to the public. The articles of association must contain the name and
domicile of the company, the purpose of the enterprise including the kinds of products
or merchandise traded or manufactured, the amount of the legal capital (Grundkapital), the
number of shares issued and their par value, and the number and qualifications of the
managing board. Id. § 23(3). They must also specify the participation of each sub-
scriber of shares and certify that all the shares of the company have been subscribed.
Id. § 23(2). The articles must be executed before a court or a "Notarr." Id. § 23(1).
A more important document of disclosure, however, is the formation report. This Is a
written report which must be filed by the promoters regarding the steps they have
taken to form the company. Id. § 32(1). It must state all material facts relating to the
adequacy of contributions in kind in exchange for shares. Where shares have been issued
in exchange for an existing business, the income from operations of the last two years must
be disclosed. Id. § 32(2). Any profits from the formation of the company must also be
disclosed. Id § 32(3).
The formation report must be examined by the managing board and the supervisory
board to determine whether the shares stated in the articles of association have been
fully subscribed and whether the consideration has been adequate. Id. § 33(1). If the
shares have been issued for a consideration other than cash or if the members of the
managing board or supervisory board had a personal interest in the formation of the
company, an additional examination of the report must be made by independent auditors.
Id. §§ 33(2) & 34(1). Written reports are filed by the managing board, the supervisory
board, and the independent auditors. Id. §§ 33 & 34.
The court also makes an examination of the application for entry into the commercial
register and the documents submitted. The court may deny the application on the ground
that any of the statements in the required reports are untrue or that property which the
company is to receive for shares or cash is grossly overvalued. Id. § 38.
The promoters, members of the managing board or supervisory board, and other persons
participating in the formation of the company are liable to the company for damages
caused by incorrect or incomplete statements in the application for registration or in the
accompanying documents. Liability is joint and several unless a promoter can prove that he
used the care of a prudent businessman. Id. §§ 46-48.
110. Id. § 29.
111. See Note (-Br-), Ausreichende Informations-Kontrolle durch Banken und Mlrsen,
1969 Bank-Betrieb 112.
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German stock exchanges. The Stock Exchange Law" requires additional
disclosure; a listing prospectus (Zulassungsprospekt) must be published
in order to obtain German stock exchange listing. The required prospec-
tus is the most detailed prospectus used in any European national mar-
ket."' The application for listing and the listing prospectus are reviewed
by the admission committee of the particular stock exchange to which
application has been made, and if the information is incomplete or the
issue would constitute a fraud on the public, the committee may refuse
to grant permission for trading."1 4
A problem, however, is that review of the listing prospectus does not
occur until after the sale of the securities because listing is not normally
applied for until after sale. Prior to and during the selling of the
securities, it has become customary to use a selling prospectus which
is not subject to statutory requirements or review by an independent
authority." 5 For this and other reasons, there has been some discussion
in Germany about revision of the Stock Exchange Law, but most com-
mentators do not believe an independent governmental authority to
review selling prospectuses is necessary, either on the national or supra-
national level.' 6
b. Continuing Disclosure in Germany
The German system of continuous corporate disclosure functions
through (1) the recognition of a shareholder's right to information and
(2) periodic reporting requirements.
Every shareholder must, at his request, be given information at the
shareholders' meeting by the board of management about any matter
on the agenda of the meeting." 7 The information must be truly and
112. B~rsengesetz of June 22, 1896, as revised May 27, 1909, § 38 [hereinafter cited as
B6rsG].
113. Mott, Foreign Bond Issues on European National Markets, 24 Bus. Law. 1285,
1297 (1969).
114. B6rsG § 36.
115. Mott, supra note 113, at 1298.
116. The "Segr6 Report" on European markets discussed favorably the idea of a
European Securities Exchange Commission. Le ddveoppement d'un rnar ch europen des
capitaux, Rapport d'un group d'experts constitut6 par la Commission de la C.E.E. 246-47
(1966). For criticism of the idea of central administrative control see Note (-Br-), supra
note 111, Koenigs, Die B6rse als Organ des Kapitalmarkts, 1968 Bank-Betrieb 329, 331.
For an argument in favor of more self-regulation by exchanges see Bremer, Die neuen
Schwerpunkte der Bbrsenreform, 1970 Der Betriebs-Berater 1.
117. AktG § 131(1). Since most shares in German stock companies are bearer shares,
many of which are deposited with banks, shareholders do not normally get direct notice
of the meeting and the agenda from the company. Notice of the meeting must be published,
however, and the managing board must send copies of the agenda for the meeting and its
recommendations as to each decision to all banks and shareholder protective organizations
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fairly given.118 There are, however, five statutory exceptions to the duty
of the managing board to supply information, the most important of
which is that disclosure need not be made if a reasonable business judg-
ment on the part of the board determines that supplying the information
would cause not inconsiderable damage to the company or a connected
enterprise.11 Significantly, there is judicial review of the board's deci-
sion ' In addition to the shareholder's right to information, those present
at the shareholders' meeting can vote to appoint special auditors to in-
vestigate a particular matter or transaction. 2' Even a minority of share-
holders can obtain the appointment of special auditors under certain
circumstances.1 22 The effectiveness of the right to information is, of
course, limited by the fact that the right exists only at the shareholders'
meeting; nevertheless, it is considered to be a very important disclosure
device.' 23
With respect to periodic reporting, a balance sheet and a profit and
loss statement as well as a business report (Geschdftsbericht) must be
prepared by the managing board within three months after the end of the
fiscal year of a stock company. 24 In the preparation of the financial
statements standard accounting principles must be followed to give an
accurate picture of the company's financial condition. 20 Consolidated
statements are required of a group of related enterprises if a stock
company belongs to the group. 20 Classifications and captions for the
annual balance sheet and the profit and loss statement are set out in
great detail by statute.27 Strict rules are also set out for the valuation of
assets and the proper showing of liabilities.1 2' The formerly widespread
which exercised the right to vote for others at the last shareholders' meeting. Shareholders
can also make proposals for the agenda and nominations for office. All proposals and
nominations for office and statements in support of proposals must be transmitted by the
banks to their clients. See Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from
the German, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 23, 56 (1966).
118. AktG § 131(2).
119. Id. § 131(3).
120. Id. § 132.
121. Id. § 142(1).
122. See id. § 142(2).
123. See R. Godin & H. Wilhelmi, Aktiengesetz, Kommentar 705-13 Anm. 1 (3d ed. 1967).
See also A. Hueck, supra note 107, at 161.
124. AktG § 148.
125. Id. § 149.
126. Id. §§ 329 & 330.
127. Id. §§ 151-52 & 157.
128. Id. §§ 153-56.
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practice of providing undisclosed or excessive reserves has been cur-
tailed by these rules."
The content of the business report which must be prepared by the
managing board is set forth in great detail by statute.' 30 The annual
financial statements must be fully explained. 3' The legal and business
relationships with connected enterprises must be disclosed, 3 2 and com-
pensation paid to members of the managing and supervisory boards
must be amplified. 33 Liability is imposed for any false statement or
omission of material fact.'3
After having been audited, the financial statements and annual report
of the managing board are examined and checked by the supervisory
board, which has the power to make independent checks of the corpora-
tion's records. The reports are then submitted with the auditor's and
supervisory board's comments to the annual shareholders' meeting' 33
The shareholders have the power to resolve any conflicts between the
managing board and the supervisory board. 3 ' The financial reports are
required to be published in the Bundesanzeiger, and all the reports,
accompanied by a notice of publication, must be submitted to the local
court which keeps the trade register. 3 '
c. Meaning for American Law
The federal securities acts embody requirements of much greater
sophistication regarding both disclosure on issuance of shares and con-
tinuing disclosure than does the German law. "' But it is the pattern
of German law rather than its substantive requirements of disclosure
which is of value for American law.
The observer of the pattern of German law is struck by the fact that
129. See Berger, Shareholder Rights Under the German Stock Corporation Law of 196S,
38 Fordham L. Rev. 687, 712-15 (1970). The elimination of the possiblity of hidden
reserves in the balance sheet is important because the disposition of retained earnings is
up to the shareholders; however, they may dispose of retained earnings only to the extent
they are shown in the annual financial statements. AktG § 174.
130. AktG § 160.
131. Id. § 160(2).
132. Id. § 160(3).
133. Id.
134. Id. § 400.
135. Id. §§ 170-71.
136. Id. § 173.
137. Id. § 177.
138. The American observer is impressed, however, by the efficiency with which dis-
closure by stock companies is disseminated and with the universality of the reporting re-
quirements.
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it is based on disclosure regarding corporations; there is almost no dis-
closure concerning securities. Furthermore, disclosure is an integral part
of the corporate law of Germany. In contrast to the American pattern,
which treats corporate disclosure as securities regulation, separate from
and in addition to the state corporation laws, the German pattern recog-
nizes that disclosure obligations should be interwoven with corporate
law and are properly required of entities granted the right to do business
in the corporate form.
The American law of disclosure could profit from consideration of
these ideas. Although disclosure in the United States must continue to
be a matter of federal law and, as such, separate from state corporation
law, and although federal disclosure requirements should not be extended
to close corporations,"3 9 it should be clearly recognized that corporate
disclosure obligations under the securities acts are in fact and function
"federal corporation laws." They have become necessary not only be-
cause of a need for uniform corporate reporting, but also because com-
petition for tax revenues and other factors have caused the states to
abdicate their responsibility to regulate corporations through disclosure
requirements and other means. State corporation laws have been weak-
ened to the point where they are now, as one commentator recently sug-
gested, "largely a compendium of procedures for the formation of
corporations and for the conduct of corporate affairs."1 40
2. Disclosure as Society-Oriented, Not Investor-Oriented
The official position of the Securities and Exchange Commission is
still that disclosure is aimed at the investment community and as such
should be investor-oriented. Even the recent Commission releases relating
to disclosure obligations concerning the environment and civil rights
justify the disclosure duty in terms of the effect on the financial con-
dition of the enterprise.' As Professor Cary has stated, in practice cor-
porations themselves recognize that disclosure properly should go beyond
merely what is required to inform investors. 42 It is commonplace for
corporations to recognize that disclosure should relate to the social
139. The federal disclosure requirements should, however, be extended to more companies.
As Professor Knauss has stated, the asset and shareholder tests contained in section 12(g)
of the Securities Exchange Act are unrealistic and many corporations which should be
required to disclose are excluded. Knauss, supra note 89, at 623-26.
140. Bahlman, Rule lob-5: The Case for its Full Acceptance as Federal Corporation
Law, 37 U. Cin. L. Rev. 727, 732 (1968).
141. See text accompanying notes 57-59 supra.
142. Cary, supra note 98, at 419.
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influences of the business and its responsibility to society.143 Again,
the German experience is instructive.
Until 1969, disclosure in German law depended on the legal form of the
enterprise and had nothing to do with the size of the entity. Only stock
companies and associations limited by shares (Kommanditgesellschaft
auf Aktien) were subject to annual reporting requirements. Other forms
of doing business are, however, very important in Germany. In 1969,
there were a total of only 2,328 stock companies as against 67,416
limited liability companies (Gesellschaft mit beschriinkter Haftung) .144
It is true that most of the latter are what would be referred to in the
United States as "close corporations" of small size, but some limited
liability companies are among Germany's largest economic enterprises.
In fact, one of the reasons for doing business in this form has been
a desire to avoid the disclosure requirements of the stock company
law. 45
However, this situation was altered by the Publicity Law (Publizitdts-
gesetz)' 40 which became effective August 15, 1969. Under this law any
business enterprise, regardless of form, is subject to annual reporting
requirements if two of the following three criteria are met: (1) a balance
sheet total (Bilanzsuinme) of more than 125 million DI; (2) annual
sales (Jahresurnsatz) of more than 250 million DM; and (3) an average
of more than 5000 employees. 47 Essentially, the law provides that during
the first three months of their fiscal year these large enterprises must
prepare a balance sheet, profit and loss statement and business report
for the previous fiscal year, submit it to independent auditors and publish
it in the Bundesanzeiger.'8 In the preparation of the financial statements
and reports, the provisions of the stock company law are applicable. 4
Special rules apply to connected enterprises to assure the filing of con-
143. Id. See also Blumberg, The Politicalization of the Corporation, 26 Bus. Law.
1551, 1554-55 (1971).
144. Gessler, Die Reform des GmbH-Rechts, 1969 Der Betriebs-Berater 589.
145. See A. Hueck, supra note 107, at 118-19, 199-200.
146. Law of 1969, [1969] BGBI. I S 1189 [hereinafter cited as PublG].
147. Id. § 3. There are certain limited exceptions and special provisions with regard to
insurance companies, cooperatives and credit institutions.
148. Partnerships and single proprietorships are exempt from the requirements of pre-
paring a business report, however. Id. § 9.
149. AktG §§ 149, 151-52 & 157-58. An exception is allowed, however, with regard to
the valuation rules applicable to balance sheets of stock companies. The Publizitfltsgesetz
does not prevent the use of "hidden reserves." See Hellner, Das Pulizittsgesetz, 1969
Zeitschrift fur das Gesamte Kreditwesen 718. See also A. Hueck, supra note 107, at 20001.
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solidated financial statements and to make certain that large enterprises
are unable to avoid disclosure by dividing into parts.150
Forty-seven limited liability companies were made subject to publicity
requirements for the first time by the new law.lel Moreover, greater
disclosure requirements have been proposed. The proposed reform of the
limited liability company law (GmbH Referenten-Entwurf) would sub-
ject all limited liability companies having a balance sheet total of more
than four million DM to disclosure requirements similar to those re-
quired of stock companies. 52 Furthermore, all limited liability companies,
regardless of size, would have to file their annual balance sheet with the
trade register where it would be open for public inspection. 153 The lat-
ter proposal is very controversial, but it is stated to be necessary for
the protection of the public and creditors'" Also proposed are new pro-
visions requiring disclosure when a limited liability company is formed
and the promoters contribute property in exchange for shares.' Such
disclosure is required of business entities in Germany even though there
may be no public trading in their shares."' This was justified to pro-
vide some measure of control over their activities, to protect creditors,157
and also because of the important effect modern corporations have on
society, especially regarding questions of social and economic policy.'58
The Securities and Exchange Commission should officially recognize
the public policy bases of disclosure that have been accepted in Germany
and have been admitted in practice by United States corporations: dis-
closure is society-oriented and is not just for investors. The continuing
movement of the 1950s and 60s toward concentration of corporate eco-
nomic power and the even greater dispersion of ownership of shares
among individuals during this period, as well as the emergence of institu-
tional investors which act for great numbers of people, have made many
150. PublG § 11.
151. Gessler, supra note 144, at 589.
152. GmbH Referenten-Entwurf § 138. There are some essential differences from the
stock company law pattern, however. For a comparison see Gessler, supra note 144, at
593-94.
153. GmbH Referenten-Entwurf § 152.
154. See Gessler, supra note 144.
155. GmbH Referenten-Entwurf § 14. See Battes, Sacheinlage und SachgrUndung Im
Referentenentwurf, 1969 Gmbh-Rdsch 253.
156. The German limited liability company is prohibited from raising money through
the public issue of stocks and bonds and its securities may not be traded on the securites
markets. A. Hueck, supra note 107, at 232.
157. See Pruhs, Die Konzernrechnungslegung nach dem Publizitiitsgesetz, 1969 Der Betrieb
1385; Deringer, Organschaft, Umwandlung und Publizitlit, 1968 Die Aktiengesellschaft 211,
214; Helner, Das Publizitatsgesetz, 1969 Bank-Betrieb 338.
158. A. Hueck, supra note 107, at 199.
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corporations quasi-governmental entities. The impact of corporate deci-
sionmaking should be opened to public view.
3. The Role of Increased Disclosure
a. What Should Be Disclosed?
New categories and required items of disclosure should be developed
by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The disclosure categories
should remain flexible and the Commission should periodically review
corporate information practices so that disclosures relate to societal
needs. Some needed categories are: (1) the impact of the corporation's
activities on the environment;.. 9 (2) hiring practices relating to women
and minority groups; (3) political contributions and activities; (4) con-
cern for the safety, health and welfare of employees; (5) concern for
product safety and corporate practice relating to consumers; (6) cor-
porate charitable contributions and philanthropic efforts; and (7) cor-
porate activities relating to the community in which major business
operations are located.
b. Disclosure for Whom?
An argument in favor of the institution of additional corporate dis-
closure requirements for the purpose of informing society, as distinct
from the investor, will be met with the question of whether this con-
stitutes a departure from the generally accepted idea that the function
of a corporation is to maximize shareholder profits. It has been stated
that substitution of the public interest for the profit motive as the guiding
principle for corporate behavior entails extensive legal consequences.-'
Full acceptance of the idea that the business corporation owes a duty
to employees, customers and the general public as well as to shareholders
may require changes in the organic structure of the corporation.'0 How-
ever, the addition of society-oriented disclosure rules to present Securities
and Exchange Commission regulation need not involve a departure from
the principle of profit maximization or require the acceptance of a totally
new concept of corporate duty. It would merely be a recognition of the
fact that the large corporation is not a private and autonomous institu-
tion, but is a community asset which is public in its conduct, its mores
and its impacts.' The basis of increased disclosure is simply that al-
159. Such disclosure is now required of federal agencies under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-95 (1970).
160. Ruder, Public Obligations of Private Corporations, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 209,
213 (1965).
161. Blumberg, supra note 143, at 1560.
162. Drucker, Big Business and the National Purpose, Harv. Bus. Rev. 48, 59 (1962).
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though a corporation exists to maximize profits, society has a right to
be informed of the undeniable public impact of its actions.
c. Why Disclosure?
Greater corporate disclosure requirements would have two important
effects. First, corporate decisions which have a societal impact would
be more open to public view. There would be increased debate among
the public and among the corporation's shareholders concerning many
decisions. Shareholder and public opinion would act as a check on manage-
ment and stimulate executives to higher ethical standards regarding
public interest matters. 63
It may be objected that under the present model for corporate action,
managers may be liable to shareholders for breach of their fiduciary duty
if they depart from the framework of profit maximization and act out
of consideration for the public interest. Professor Schwartz has explored
this argument in depth and has found it to be lacking.'" Under the
business judgment rule corporate managers can act in an enlightened
way, sacrificing immediate profits for long-term gains both for the corpo-
ration and for society. Expenses may be undertaken which do not increase
profits but which improve the welfare of the community in which the
corporation operates.'65
A second result of increased disclosure would be to expose those areas
of corporate behavior which cannot be reformed internally, but which
must be dealt with through government action and legislation. The
theory here is that disclosure is the least restrictive form of regulation
in that it provides an incentive for self-reform. But there will be matters
which can be corrected only through direct action by government. Dis-
closure would provide a basis for knowing when new laws are needed
and, just as important, when they are not needed.
IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIETY-ORIENTED
DIsCLosuRE REQUIREMENTS
The most practical way to provide increased information concerning
the impact of the corporation's activities in a way which would not be
unduly burdensome is to utilize the annual report to shareholders. At
the present time the annual report must accompany or precede each
proxy statement which solicits proxies on behalf of management for the
election of directors.' 66 For the most part, management may determine
163. It is well accepted that disclosure has a beneficial effect on ethical standards. See
Cary, supra note 98, at 417.
164. Schwartz, supra note 10, at 462-82.
165. Id.
166. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (1971).
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its content,6 7 and the report is not deemed to be "soliciting material"
or to be "filed" with the Securities and Exchange Commission so as to
subject the corporation to the civil and criminal penalties which are the
usual consequence of a violation concerning soliciting materials filed with
the Commission.e'
Nevertheless, the annual report to shareholders is probably the single
most important disclosure document required by the Commission. To-
gether with the proxy statement, it is disseminated more widely than even
the Securities Act prospectus in that it must be sent to all shareholders
of record.' 69 The annual report, in contrast to the proxy statement, is
normally full of brightly colored photographs, thus attracting more atten-
tion; but studies have shown that it is an important tool for professional
analysts as well, and that markets frequently react to its publication. 70
The Commission should revise its requirements relating to the share-
holders' annual report in order that it may realize its full potential.'
The content of the annual report should be directly specified by Com-
mission rule, and at least part of the report should be considered soliciting
material filed with the Commission." - The society-oriented disclosure
categories discussed above173 should be a requisite part of the filed con-
tent of the annual report. The latter document would thus be primarily
society-oriented while other disclosure mechanisms could continue to
serve the traditional functions of disclosure. Societal disclosure could
in this way be required without a complete departure from present prac-
tice. 7 4 Moreover, in recent years annual reports have tended to serve
as a vehicle for emphasizing the corporation's social responsibility; many
reports are replete with information relating to efforts to abate environ-
mental and community problems. This proposal would merely subject
these disclosures to Securities and Exchange Commission rules. There
would be two other major legal consequences: new possibilities would
167. Id.
168. Id. § 240.14a-3 (c).
169. Id. § 240.14a-3(a).
170. Wheat, The Disclosure Policy of the SEC, 24 Bus. Law. 33, 39 (1968).
171. One of the major faults of the Wheat Report was its failure to recommend any
substantial change regarding annual reports. See The Wheat Report 371-73.
172. This has been proposed by Professor Loss. See 46 ALI Proceedings 260 (1969).
173. See text accompanying and following note 159 supra.
174. It is questionable whether sodetal disclosure can be compelled by Securities and
Exchange Commission rulemaking. It may be argued that the Commission may properly
make rules in this regard since section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act authorizes
the Commission to make such rules and regulations as are necessary "in the public interest
or for the protection of investors." Securities Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)
(1970).
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be opened for the use of the shareholder proposal rule171 of the Com-
mission, and corporations would be subjected to potentially greater civil
and criminal liability for violations of disclosure requirements.
A. New Possibilities for Use of Shareholder Proxy Proposals
There is a significant trend in the law to increase shareholder access
to the proxy machinery administered by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Professor Eisenberg has argued that the Commission proxy
rules are deficient in providing shareholder access since they are rooted
in the original philosophy of the securities acts which was to provide
information and control the use of false informationY.7  He proposes
that shareholders should be granted the right to designate candidates
for the board of directors in the corporate proxy materials. 7 In addition,
groups of shareholders have been formed which have attempted to use
the proxy machinery to carry on "public interest proxy contests" to
compel corporations to have greater regard for the public interest.178 The
culmination of this movement was the case of Medical Committee for
Human Rights v. SEC,'7" which was the product of judicial frustration
with the inconsistent and conservative manner which for decades has
characterized Commission policy regarding shareholder access to the
corporate proxy machinery.
Medical Committee involved the presentation of a proposed shareholder
resolution to the management of Dow Chemical Company for inclusion
in management's proxy materials prepared in connection with the annual
meeting of shareholders.' The management of Dow announced its in-
175. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1971). This rule requires management to include in its
proxy solicitation material any shareholder proposal other than those related to elections
to office. There are three substantive exceptions to inclusion: (1) a proposal that is not a
proper subject for shareholder action under state law, (2) a proposal submitted primarily
to promote general economic, political, racial, religious, social or other similar causes, and
(3) a proposal relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the issuer.
Id. § 240.14a-8(c).
176. Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1489 (1970).
177. Id. at 1502-11. This right is recognized under state law but is artificially restricted
by the proxy rules. Eisenberg's proposal is that it should at least be possible for shareholders
owning some minimum percentage of the corporation's stock to designate candidates for
office.
178. The most famous of these has been "Campaign GM" conducted by the "Project on
Corporate Responsibility." For an account see Schwartz, supra note 10, at 527.
179. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded for dismissal as moot, 92 S. Ct.
577 (1972), noted in 39 Fordham L. Rev. 791 (1971).
180. The resolution read as follows: "RESOLVED, that the shareholders of the Dow
Chemical Company request that the Board of Directors . . . consider the advisability of
adopting a resolution setting forth an amendment to the composite certificate of incorpo.
ration of the Dow Chemical Company that the company shall not make napalm." Id. at 663.
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tention to omit the proposal and the Securities and Exchange Commission
refused to compel its inclusion. On direct judicial review, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the
Commission's acquiescence (by its "no action" letter) in Dow's decision
was reviewable. The court further found that the Commission had mis-
applied proxy rule 14a-8181 and remanded the matter for further pro-
ceedings.' 82 In order to aid the Commission on remand, the court of-
fered advice to the Commission with respect to interpreting its own
rule. The court took a restrictive view of the general cause exception'8
to the shareholder proposal rule, favoring the interpretation that it has
no application regarding proposals even of a general or social nature as
long as they relate to a matter completely within the sphere of corporate
activity."' The court also seemed to view the ordinary business operations
exception 85 as inapplicable if the proposal is a proper subject for share-
holder action under state law, thus greatly diminishing its scope and
status as an independent ground for the omission of a shareholder pro-
posal. 86
One of the results of Medical Committee has been to compel the Com-
mission to reevaluate its policy relating to the shareholder proposal rule.
Legal writers have discussed alternatives for consideration by the Com-
mission. 87 Professor Chisum has argued 8 that the only sound exception
to allowing shareholder proposals is the "proper subject" exception,180
and that therefore the other exceptions should be eliminated. This makes
eminent good sense in the light of the policy of the proxy rules and the
shareholder proposal rule. There is no reason why the federal proxy
rules should provide barriers to shareholder access to the proxy machinery
in addition to those provided by state law.
If as a result of the decision in Medical Committee and the ensuing
181. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1971).
182. 432 F.2d at 681-82.
183. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(2) (1971).
184. 432 F.2d at 681. The SEC has proposed an amendment to the general cause exception
that seems to accept the court's view. The proposed amendment would permit management
to omit a shareholder proposal if it relates to the enforcement of a personal claim or grievance
or if it consists of a recommendation that action be taken with respect to any matter that
is not significantly related to the business of the issuer or not within its control. CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. ff 78,465, at 81,009.
185. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5) (1971).
186. 432 F.2d at 681. For a complete analysis of Medical Committee see Chisum, Napalm,
Proxy Proposals and the SEC, 12 Ariz. L. Rev. 463 (1970).
187. E.g., Allen, The Proxy System and the Promotion of Social Goals, 26 Bus. Law.
481 (1970); Schwartz, supra note 10.
188. Chisum, supra note 186, at 475.
189. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (1) (1971).
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discussion the shareholder proposal rule is revised along the lines sug-
gested by Professor Chisum, and if the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission were to consider the shareholders' annual report as soliciting
material containing required categories of society-oriented disclosure,
far-reaching possibilities would be opened for the use of shareholder pro-
posals. The shareholders' annual report could be required to be sent 90
days before the proxy statement, thereby affording shareholders an op-
portunity to formulate proposals based on the information in the annual
report. Under a liberalized rule 14a-8, public interest proposals on almost
any matter germane to corporate affairs would be included in the proxy
materials so that these matters would at least be opened for public
discussion, and corporate managers would be under pressure to either
change their policies or defend them on the merits.19 0
B. Potential Consequences with Respect
to Civil and Criminal Liability
The proxy rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission prohibit
the use of false or misleading statements of material facts or omissions
of material facts in the solicitation of proxies.' The Commission is
authorized to investigate possible violations 92 and to seek injunctive
relief in a federal district court. 93 Willful violators are subject to crim-
inal penalties. 94 In addition, the United States Supreme Court has im-
plied a private right of action for injunctive or monetary relief, which
can be used by any person damaged or threatened with damage by any
violation of the Commission's proxy rules.' 8
This powerful array of private and administrative deterrents is not
applicable, however, to false or misleading statements or omissions of
material facts contained in the shareholders' annual report. In the recent
case of Dillon v. Berg,"" the court held that the language in rule
14a-3 (c). 7 stating that the annual report is neither deemed to be "solicit-
ing material" nor to be "filed" with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion has the effect not only of exempting the annual report from section
190. Chisum, supra note 186, at 476. One of the results of "Campaign GM" has been
that the management of General Motors Corporation has undertaken many reforms and
has had to justify its corporate policies to the public. See Schwartz, supra note 10.
191. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1971).
192. Securities Exchange Act § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1970).
193. Id. § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970).
194. Id. § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1970).
195. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964).
196. 326 F. Supp. 1214 (D. Del. 1971).
197. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(c) (1971).
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18 of the Securities Exchange Act,1 " but also of exempting it from all
the other proxy rules (including the anti-fraud provision)1' 9 except rule
14a-3 .200 The court stated that the annual report must be totally dis-
regarded for purposes of determining whether the proxy materials vio-
lated section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Acte"' since that report
is regulated solely by rule 14a-3, which contains no prohibition against
the use of misleading statements. -°
It is submitted that this decision creates an intolerable gap in the
Commission's proxy rules. Unless corrected, it will result in even greater
use of the annual report by companies without regard for standards of
disclosure that they must respect in other documents required by the
Commission. It is true that statements made in annual reports have given
rise to liability under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and
rule 10b-5,2 0  but this is not as effective as rule 14a-9(a) - ° liability
since rule 10b-5 imposes liability in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security, not in the solicitation of proxies.20  The exemption of the
annual report from the anti-fraud requirements of rule 14a-9(a) conflicts
with the basic policy of the Commission's proxy machinery which is to
require disclosure of information which will result in informed share-
holder voting. It is indisputable that the annual report has the potential
to influence the shareholder voting decision. It should be subject to the
same anti-fraud requirements as are the rest of the proxy materials.
Such would be the result if the Commission were to amend rule 14a-3
so that the annual report would be considered to be "filed" and "soliciting
material" for purposes of the proxy rules. If in addition the Commission
were to utilize the annual report to require new categories of society-
oriented disclosure, rule 14a-9(a) would also operate to assure the truth
198. Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act imposes civil liability for misleading
statements and omissions of material fact contained in any document "filed" pursuant to
any provision or rule of the Act in favor of a person who in reliance on the document
purchased or sold a security to his damage. Largely because of the reliance requirement,
this provision has never been used. See Securities Exchange Act § 18, 15 US.C. § 78r (1970).
199. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1971).
200. 326 F. Supp. at 1230-31. The court rejected the view of Professor Loss that Rule
14a-3(c) merely provides immunity from section 18 of the Act. 2 L. Loss, Securities Regula-
tion 887-88 (2d ed. 1961), as supplemented, 5 id. 2850 (Supp. 1969).
201. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
202. 326 F. Supp. at 1231.
203. See, e.g., Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
903 (1969).
204. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1971).
205. See Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1146,
1157 (1965).
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and objectivity of society-oriented disclosure. Less than complete candor
with respect to the impact of a corporation's activities on society would
then be subject to private actions for injunctive or monetary relief and
Commission enforcement.
V. CONCLUSION
New categories of society-oriented disclosure should be developed by
the Securities and Exchange Commission and required of corporations.
In order to increase corporate responsibility, a corporation should be
required to disclose fully the impact of its activities on society. The
annual report to shareholders should be the vehicle for the new dis-
closure requirements, and it should be considered soliciting material filed
with the Commission. If accompanied by liberalization of the shareholder
proposal rule, there would be an enormous impact on the role of share-
holders in the modern corporation and on corporate responsibility.
